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thanksgiving	for	the	new	life—	what	Wittgenstein	called	a	‘trusting’	(ein	Vertrauen,	ibid.)—	then	it	is	a	genuine	manifestation	of	religious	faith.		 Wittgenstein’s	point	here	provides	the	material	for	a	possible	riposte	to	a	common	attack	mounted	by	atheist	critics	of	religion	such	as	Sigmund	Freud,	namely	that	religious	behaviour	is	an	infantile	response	to	our	helplessness	and	the	need	for	protection	against	natural	threats—	‘the	majestic,	cruel	and	inexorable	powers	of	nature’	(Freud	1985	[1929],	p.	195);	David	Hume	similarly	traced	the	origins	of	religion	to	the	‘incessant	hopes	and	fears	that	actuate	mankind’	(Hume,	1757,	Ch.	2).	It	is	no	doubt	true	that	many	religious	adherents	have	had	recourse	to	ritual	practices	in	a	desperate	attempt	to	avert	disaster;	but	assimilating	all	religious	belief	and	activity	to	this	model	seems	a	massive	over-simplification.	The	exclamation	of	Job	in	the	Hebrew	Bible,	‘though	he	slay	me,	yet	will	I	trust	in	him’	(Job	1:4)	looks	much	more	like	an	expression	of	Vertrauen	than	an	attempt	at	superstitious	manipulation;	and	many	other	similar	scriptural	texts	could	be	cited.	So	seeing	religion	as	a	primitive,	quasi-scientific	attempt	to	control	a	hostile	world,	while	it	may	fit	the	way	some	religious	practitioners	think,	does	not	seem	to	match	what	is	going	on	in	large	chunks	of	mainstream	religious	thought	and	practice.			 Not	only	does	Wittgenstein	implicitly	reject	the	hostile	construal	of	religion	as	a	primitive	pseudo-technology,	but	he	also	makes	it	clear	that	he	does	not	see	religion	as	in	any	way	assimilable	to	explanatory	cosmology	or	science.	He	had	little	truck	with	the	kind	of	theological	metaphysics	that	attempts	to	present	God’s	existence	as	something	that	can	be	demonstratively	established,	or	even	shown	to	be	reasonably	probable.	A	believer,	he	observed,	would	never	come	to	believe	as	a	result	of	the	supposed	‘proofs’	of	God’s	existence	(CV	85);	and	the	whole	project	of	‘philosophical	theology’,	he	once	remarked,	struck	him	as	‘indecent’	(Drury,	1984,	p.	90).	For	those	(including	many	prominent	theologians	and	philosophers)	who	treat	theism	as	a	probable	hypothesis	for	accounting	for	the	existence	or	nature	of	the	cosmos,	Wittgenstein	appears	to	have	had	something	like	bemused	contempt:	‘can	you	imagine	St	Augustine	saying	that	the	existence	of	God	was	highly	probable!’,	he	remarked	to	Drury	(ibid;	contrast,	for	example,	Swinburne,	2011).	Consistently	with	his	move	away	from	the	monolithic	science-oriented	view	of	language	he	had	espoused	in	the	Tractatus,	Wittgenstein	came	to	think	that	religious	language	should	not	be	thought	of	as	in	any	way	competing	with	science:	it	had	another	function	altogether.		
Forms	of	life,	and	the	importance	of	context	and	praxis	The	lesson	to	be	drawn	from	Wittgenstein’s	later	philosophy	is	that	if	we	wish	to	understand	any	type	of	language,	including	religious	language,	we	have	to	look	at	the	‘form	of	life’	in	which	it	is	embedded.	Wittgenstein’s	interest	in	‘forms	of	life’	(Lebensformen),	was	in	some	respects	a	‘holistic’	reaction	against	the	atomistic	approach	to	meaning	he	had	espoused	in	the	Tractatus	(where	an	individual	proposition	was	taken	to	be	a	‘picture	of	reality’,	T	4.01).	Our	language	games,	he	later	came	to	see,	are	interwoven	with	a	web	of	non-linguistic	activities,	and	cannot	be	understood	apart	from	the	context	that	gives	them	life.	Wittgenstein	insisted	that	‘in	a	religious	discourse	we	use	such	expressions	as:	“I	believe	that	so	and	so	will	happen”	…	differently	to	the	way	in	which	we	use	them	in	science’.	So	to	believe	in	the	Last	Judgement	is	not	assimilable	to	an	ordinary	belief	that	a	certain	event	will	very	probably	happen	at	some	time	in	the	future	(LC,	p.	57).	As	one	commentator	has	aptly	put	it,	Wittgenstein’s	aim	is	to	show	how	concepts	such	as	sin,	redemption,	judgement,	grace	and	atonement	‘can	have	an	indispensible	place	in	an	individual’s	or	a	
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reasonableness	of	religious	belief	in	the	light	of	dispassionate	scrutiny	of	the	evidence	(LC	58).		 The	Kierkegaardian	or	fideist	influences	on	Wittgenstein’s	thought	are	particularly	apparent	in	his	often	quoted	remark	in	Culture	and	Value:	‘it	appears	to	me	as	though	a	religious	belief	could	only	be	(something	like)	passionately	committing	oneself	to	a	system	of	reference’	(CV	73).	The	implication	here	might	be	taken	to	be	that	belief,	in	the	normal	sense	of	the	term,	namely	assent	to	a	proposition	with	a	certain	cognitive	content,	drops	out	of	the	picture	completely	in	Wittgenstein’s	conception	of	religious	faith,	leaving	simply	the	volitional	act	of	committing	oneself.	Extrapolating	from	this,	those	later	writers	who	espoused	a	‘non-cognitivist’	or	anti-realist	approach	to	philosophy	of	religion	maintained	that	religious	language	about	God	should	not	be	understood	as	making	factual	claims,	stating	facts,	or	describing	reality	at	all.	Thus	the	well-known	Welsh	philosopher	of	religion	D.	Z.	Phillips,	explicitly	invoking	Wittgenstein’s	ideas	about	language	games,	stressed	that	if	we	want	to	understand	religious	talk	properly,	we	should	not	interpret	it	as	referring	to	the	‘reality’	of	God.	‘Theological	realism’,	observed	Phillips,	‘often	indulges	in	philosophy	by	italics.	We	are	told	that	we	could	not	worship	unless	we	believed	that	God	exists.	We	are	told	that	we	cannot	talk	to	God	unless	he	is	there	to	talk	to.	And	so	on.	But	nothing	is	achieved	by	italicising	these	words.	The	task	of	clarifying	their	grammar	when	they	are	used	remains’	(Phillips,	1993,	p.	35).		There	are	two	questions	here.	The	first	is	whether	rejecting	a	realist	construal	of	religious	language	is	tenable,	and	the	second	is	whether	this	position	can	be	laid	at	Wittgenstein’s	door.	On	the	first	question,	many	critics	have	insisted	that	the	anti-realist	approach	fails	to	match	the	actual	beliefs	and	practices	of	ordinary	religious	adherents:	‘When	ordinary	people	pray	it	is	because	they	think	there	is	a	God	up	there	listening.	But	whether	or	not	there	is	a	God	listening	to	their	prayer	isn’t	itself	part	of	the	language	game.	The	reason	people	play	the	language	game	of	religion	is	because	they	think	there	is	something	outside	the	language	game	that	gives	it	a	point’	(Searle,	1987,	p.	344-5). What	is	more,	to	say	that	a	religious	belief	just	is	a	commitment	appears	to	sidestep	the	question	of	justification	in	a	problematic	way	(cf.	Hyman	2001).	Commitments,	though	it	may	be	psychologically	possible	to	make	them	in	the	absence	of	prior	beliefs,	seem	to	presuppose,	for	their	validity,	the	objective	truth	of	the	beliefs	logically	required	by	the	nature	of	the	commitment.	If	I	commit	myself	to	a	loved	one,	or	to	God,	my	commitment	will	lose	its	justification	if	the	object	of	my	commitment	turns	out	not	to	exist,	or	to	be	wholly	unworthy	of	my	commitment.	On	the	second	question,	of	whether	Wittgenstein	himself	espoused	this	type	of	non-cognitivist	view,	Severin	Schroeder	has	argued	that	that,	contrary	to	the	common	reading	of	his	remarks	in	Culture	and	Value,	Wittgenstein	is	not	proposing	a	purely	expressivist	construal	of	credal	statements	(Schroeder,	2007).	In	saying	that	religious	belief	‘can	only	be	a	passionate	commitment’,	Wittgenstein	may	simply	be	underlining	the	inescapability	of	a	passionate,	volitional	element;	he	need	not	be	saying	that	what	is	involved	in	the	belief	is	merely	the	commitment—	as	if	nothing	else,	no	cognitive	or	doxastic	(belief)	elements,	were	entailed.	On	the	matter	of	phrasing,	Schroeder	appears	to	have	a	strong	case.	To	say,	for	example,	‘that	remark	can	only	have	been	a	joke’	does	not	imply	that	it	was	humorous	and	nothing	else;	it	does	not,	for	example	rule	out	its	being	apt,	or	malicious,	or	referring	to	a	true	state	of	affairs.	In	any	case,	there	are,	as	Schroeder	points	out,	many	passages	where	Wittgenstein	makes	it	quite	explicit	that	belief	is	involved	in	religious	commitment.	In	the	very	next	sentence	following	his	remark	about	‘passionate	commitment’,	he	goes	on	to	say	‘Hence,	although	it	is	belief,	it	
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experience	that	is	available	only	as	a	result	of	certain	inner	transformations.	This	may	partly	be	what	Wittgenstein	had	in	mind	when	he	remarked	‘Only	love	can	believe	the	resurrection’	(VB,	p.	33).	Saying	this	need	not	imply	some	kind	of	subjectivism	about	religious	truth;	it	merely	makes	the	point	that	there	may	be	some	truths	whose	
accessibility	conditions	include	certain	requirements	as	to	the	attitude	of	the	subject	(cf.	Cottingham,	2005,	ch	5).	In	other	words,	it	may	point	to	what	one	might	call	a	‘Pascalian’	epistemology:	the	idea	that	opening	the	heart	may	have	the	result	of	disclosing	evidence	that	was	before	occluded.	It	is	not	that	there	is	no	evidence	of	any	kind,	but	rather	that,	as	Pascal	put	it,	there	is	‘enough	light	for	those	who	desire	to	see,	and	enough	darkness	for	those	of	a	contrary	disposition’	(Pascal,	1962	[1670],	no.	149).		Interpreting	the	Gospel	accounts	of	the	early	disciples’	belief	in	the	Resurrection	in	Wittgensteinian	terms,	we	may	say	that	they	seized	passionately	upon	a	new	framework	of	interpretation:	what	had	seemed	total	failure,	marked	by	a	horrible	and	humiliating	execution,	was	subsequently	perceived	as	the	prelude	to	the	triumphant	proclamation	of	a	message	of	hope.	As	noted	earlier,	we	do	not	have	to	say	that	this	interpretive	shift	implies	no	cognitive	change—	no	change	in	belief	contents.	In	adopting	such	a	framework,	the	disciples	surely	did	shift	their	beliefs:	with	the	new	framework	went	a	return	from	despair	to	faith	in	God,	and	a	belief	that	his	power	was	manifested	in	the	risen	Christ.	Nor,	picking	up	the	point	just	made	about	evidence,	do	we	have	to	say	that	the	new	belief	was	held	contra-rationally,	or	without	any	evidence	whatever;	what	is	suggested	instead	by	the	Gospel	narrative	(for	example	the	report	that	‘some	doubted’	even	in	the	face	of	the	post	resurrection	appearances	of	Christ,	Matthew	28:17)	is	that	the	evidence	was	not	‘spectator	evidence’,	readily	accessible	to	any	dispassionate	observer,	but	was	evidence	of	the	kind	that	requires	an	inner	transformation	to	enable	the	subject	to	apprehend	it	(cf.	Coakley,	2002;	Moser,	2008).		Attributing	to	Wittgenstein	something	like	this	view	of	the	kind	of	evidence	relevant	to	religious	belief	receives	strong	support	from	one	of	his	most	pregnant	remarks	about	religion:	‘life	can	educate	one	to	a	belief	in	God’	(CV	86).	It	is	clear	that	‘education’	involved	cannot,	according	to	Wittgenstein,	be	the	kind	that	one	receives	in	the	study	or	seminar	room,	through	a	dispassionate	study	of	the	evidence	or	arguments	for	God’s	existence.	Rather,	the	‘lessons	of	life’	are	ones	that	change	one’s	emotional	perspective,	making	one	vulnerable,	opening	the	heart,	so	that	beliefs	one	was	previously	blocked	from	entertaining	seriously	now	become	live	options	(cf.	Cottingham,	2009,	pp.	224ff).	Conversion,	in	short,	is	a	matter	of	breaking	down	the	barriers	to	perception,	or	demolishing	the	defences	we	all	have	against	becoming	open	and	receptive	in	this	way.	Wittgenstein	himself	confessed	in	1946:	‘I	cannot	kneel	to	pray	because	it’s	as	though	my	knees	are	stiff.	I	am	afraid	of	disintegration	(of	my	disintegration),	if	I	become	soft’	(VB,	p.	56).	And	an	enigmatic	remark	made	in	1937	may	also	plausibly	be	taken	as	a	comment	on	his	own	inability	to	become	a	believer:	‘The	edifice	of	your	pride	has	to	be	dismantled.	And	that	means	frightful	work’	(CV	30).	These	considerations	need	not,	of	course,	in	any	way	imply	that	anyone	who	(like	Wittgenstein	himself)	fails	to	take	the	road	to	conversion	is	therefore	making	a	philosophical	or	personal	mistake.	On	this	point,	as	in	all	areas	of	his	life,	Wittgenstein	himself	was	ready	to	be	harshly	self-critical;	but	on	balance	his	views	on	religious	belief	seem	in	the	end	to	be	philosophically	neutral	on	the	question	of	whether	adopting	such	a	perspective	is	the	right	thing	to	do—	albeit	they	often	show	a	distinct	sympathy	for	the	religious	worldview,	and	even	a	longing	for	the	‘safety’	it	seems	to	offer.	What	can	be	said,	as	we	bring	this	discussion	of	Wittgenstein’s	views	on	religion	to	a	close,	is	that	his	rich	and	fertile	remarks	have	the	merit	of	offering	a	far	richer	and	more	humane	
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